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Introduction 
Our country continues to provide hope on the continent, especially 
in the search for peace. We recall that during the two presentations 
to the United Nations Security Council for the deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission in Burundi, in 2002 and 2003, council 
members unanimously emphasised the importance that South Africa 
is playing in the continent. This view has been expressed in many 
other forums. (Zuma, 2003) 
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the non-
racial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the 
formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the 
establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, 
one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be 
security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was 
therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was 
believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the 
enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some 
parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and 
disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations 
prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time 
(Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the 
ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional 
powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the 
pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in 
the region and within South Africa itself.  
Since South Africa’s acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has 
attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on 
security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 
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softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military co-
operation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of 
creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and 
later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the 
creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which 
operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military co-
operation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments 
obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the 
subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the 
backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states 
illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the 
interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed 
to regional tensions.2  
Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that 
the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the 
African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, 
the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, 
Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the 
SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the 
brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy 
foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, 
but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, 
interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007).  
The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational 
and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just 
a paper tiger, or is it “real progress” and an example of “successful” regional co-
operation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and 
integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between 
SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a 
security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, 
the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role 
played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.  
                                            
1 The “C” has been added later after the SADC members agreed on the judicial 
framework for the OPDSC and its operationalisation in 2001. 
2 There exists a vast literature covering the political crisis in SADC following the 
two interventions, see for instance Mandrup 2007a; Hammerstad 2003. 
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Security co-operation in Africa: Security on the continental and at sub-regional 
levels 
The members of the now defunct continental Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) through their 1993 Cairo decision expressed the ambition that the OAU, and 
therefore also from 2002 the AU, should be able to deal effectively with the 
mounting challenge of conflict and destabilisation that afflicts the continent. The 
initiatives taken by the AU to handle security challenges on the continent was not 
new, but rather a renewed attempt to take responsibility for Africa’s problems. 
However, it was only after the establishment of the AU in 2002 that the needed 
institutional reforms were initiated, attempting to bring to life these ambitions by the 
establishment of the relevant African Security Architecture. Based on a subsidiary 
principle, the AU’s five economic regions were each given the responsibility of 
setting up a stand-by brigade for the use of the AU.3 (See Map below)4 
 
                                            
3 For further reading on the African security architecture see for instance Mandrup 
and Moeller, The African Union: A Common Security Structure in the making? in 
Thruelsen (ed.). 2009. International Organisations: Their Role in Conflict 
Management. 
4 Map of African regions used with permission of the Institute for Security Studies, 
South Africa. 
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The SADC was given the responsibility of setting up a brigade for the Southern 
African region. The AU’s acceptance of the regional structures at face value has 
several inherent weaknesses, chiefly that the five regions do not correlate with the 
existing regional organisations to be found on the continent. In relation to the 
SADC, this means that, for instance, Tanzania, Madagascar and the Indian Ocean 
Islands, and the DR Congo (DRC) all take part in setting up the SADCBRIG, but in 
reality also belong to other regions. This is problematic in the sense that the situation 
creates uncertainty about who contributes to what regional brigade. In East Africa, 
the other members seem rather certain that, for instance, Tanzania will join 
EASBrig, despite its involvement in SADCBRIG and statements to the opposite. 
Another problem with the AU regional model is that three of the stand-by brigades, 
South, Central and West Africa, are tied to a regional organisation, while this is not 
the case in East and North Africa. The result is that stand-by brigades are formed 
outside a regional framework, creating uncertainty of the nature and capacity of 
these institutions.  
Security co-operation in SADC: Some reflections on the nature of the co-
operation 
Already in 1992, the SADC signed the SADC Treaty, which stipulated that the 
organisation should include co-operation on security. In the treaty it was stated that 
SADC should:  
… promote common political values, systems and other shared 
values, which are transmitted through institutions that are 
democratic, legitimate and effective; consolidate, defend and 
maintain democracy, peace, security and stability (SADC 1992 
Article 5, 1. a-c). 
Security-co-operation was therefore explicitly included in the treaty from the 
beginning as one of the building blocks of future regional co-operation. In 1996, the 
SADC decided to establish the OPDSC5, taking over from the old Front-Line State 
                                            
5 The Organ is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region. It reports 
to the SADC Summit and is headed by a Troika, consisting of a chairperson, 
incoming chairperson and outgoing chairperson. The SADC Summit Troika and the 
Organ Troika are mutually exclusive. A ministerial committee comprising of the 
ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security 
from each of the member states reports to the chairperson and is responsible for the 
co-ordination of the work of the Organ and its structures. Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of each member state perform the functions of the Organ relating to politics 
and diplomacy within the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Ministers 
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(FLS) arrangement, which had lost its rationale with the end of apartheid.6 However, 
the Organ did not become operational until after the Blantyre Summit in August 
2001 (SADC 2001). The five years in between showed the SADC that ambitions 
stated in the Treaty were difficult to institutionalise effectively, because, among 
other things, due to differences in opinion on the direction and ambitions for the 
SADC community’s future development. 
Several SADC member states have been and continue to be plagued by 
insecurity, underdevelopment, political tension and conflict, and there seems to have 
been a split in the organisation concerning its direction for future development. The 
objectives stated in the Treaty and the creation of the OPDSC all tend to point 
towards the creation of a security community. In contrast, however, the signing of 
the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP), the continued instability in the DRC and the 
handling of the political crises in, for instance, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, indicate to 
some extent that SADC is not going to transform itself into a security community, 
but that it will remain a looser association of states. As Nathan (2006) argues, it is 
difficult for states to integrate and develop into a community, when several of the 
members are still plagued by internal strife and instability. The problem of course 
being that integration and the sense of community are based on trust, which is 
difficult to establish if you fear the instability and values of your neighbour. This has 
turned out to have severe negative consequences for the military co-operation in the 
organisation.7  
In 1992, when the SADC treaty was signed in Windhoek, a section concerning 
future security co-operation within the SADC was included. The declaration stated 
that there was a need for:  
… a framework of co-operation, which provides for … strengthening 
regional solidarity, peace and security, in order for the people of the 
region to live and work together in peace and harmony … The region 
                                                                                            
for Defence, Public Security and State Security work through the Inter-state Defence 
and Security Committee (ISS 2009). 
6 The FLS alliance, consisting of Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe (1980) and Namibia (1990), was established in 1975, and 
focused on the decolonisation process in southern Africa, at a time when white 
minority regimes were in control in both Rhodesia and South Africa. The primary 
purpose of the creation of the FLS was to fight apartheid, and the formation of the 
alliance in 1975 was a consequence of South Africa’s weakened regional hegemonic 
position after the failure of President Vorster’s détente policies and the removal of 
the Portuguese “cordon sanitare” that had protected South Africa. 
7 For further reading on the nature of SADC co-operation, whether it is a community 
etc. See for instance Ngoma 2005; Nathan 2006; Hammerstad 2003; Vale 2003. 
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needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to 
strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and 
security (SADC 1992). 
The signing of the declaration and the provisions stipulated in it expressed the 
new wave of hope and co-operation that spread like concentric rings throughout the 
African continent following the end of the Cold War in 1989–90 and the collapse of 
the apartheid regime in South Africa in the early 1990s. Hope was expressed that the 
African states could help each other in securing a stable future focused on 
developmental issues. A strong partnership between the southern African states 
would make it possible to create a foundation for a renaissance in the southern 
Africa sub-region, as well as Africa as a whole. At the time, South African Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki called this the beginning of an African Renaissance, by 
means of which the continent would be enabled to blossom. The political leadership 
realised, however, that this could not be done without the creation of a stable 
political environment. It was therefore necessary to create a structure for security co-
operation that might be able to provide stability, and at the same time respond 
swiftly to any evolving crisis. There could be no renaissance without peace and 
stability, and consequently there was a need for a strong regional collective security 
system able to handle the full spectrum of conflict, including a credible military 
capability.  
The establishment of the SADCBRIG can, in some way, be seen as the 
culmination of the development of a security dimension in the SADC community. 
The SADC treaty of 1992 stipulates that security must be one of five pillars and 
integral to the areas for future co-operation between the SADC members. However, 
co-operation on security can take on many forms, and the history of the organisation 
since 1992 shows that it has been difficult for members to agree on security co-
operation. Co-operation on security between states with divergent attitudes on issues 
such as human rights, democracy has proved to be problematic. It was particularly 
difficult to find a common platform upon which to anchor the desired co-operation. 
The South African leadership recognised the potential problems at an early stage in 
the process. Former Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad argued in 1996 in relation 
to the tension between South Africa’s overarching foreign policy ambitions and the 
realities in South-South co-operation “There must be a possible [sic] contradiction 
between South-South co-operation and the values which we may want to protect. 
There has to be interaction between theory and practice”. (Mills 1997:1). This 
statement by Pahad illustrates what has since then turned out to be a major 
predicament in South African foreign policy, i.e. creating consistency between 
theory and practice. In the area of security this has been particularly visible, because 
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South Africa is an arena of relative peace, democracy and stability in an African 
security landscape plagued by war, conflict and undemocratic governments.  
The interaction between theory and practice has been hotly debated in academic 
circles, and has been visible in the academic debate over SADC co-operation and 
integration and – of relevance to the topic of this article – co-operation in terms of 
security in particular. The SADC argues in its charter that the ambition is to create a 
“community”. However, as argued by Nathan (2006: 2004), the very notion that the 
SADC is a community is questionable. The SADC region has never been 
characterised by close social relations and contacts between its member states. To be 
a community, there needs to be a common sense of belonging, that is, common 
values, goals, objectives etc.8 SADC co-operation is still understood as an 
association, with disagreements continually being solved by the use of force or by 
threats. According to Vale (2003:121), formal agreements still direct co-operation as 
exemplified by the MDP while individual members of SADC continue to prioritise 
national interests over collective ones. The SADC is, according to Vale (2003:123), 
not a community, but merely a Westphalian system structured around “South Africa 
– the first in a community of unequal’s”. He also argues that: 
The failure to recognize that the SADC was less than it pretended to 
be eventually corroded the media hype and propaganda that were 
frantically being used to build its image – and South Africa’s averred 
pivotal role in it (Vale 2003:122).  
Swatuk (2003:8), in support of this view, argues that high politics in the SADC 
continue to be the “province of military power, diplomacy and statecraft”. It is of 
course true that, despite the 2001 reform process, only limited progress has been 
detected in several sections of the SADC’s co-operation. However, progress has 
been made and especially the introduction of several reform proposals and common 
value documents, common standards for electoral reform, show that at least the 
institutional frameworks are being created and thus fulfilling elements of the long-
term objective of creating common standards and values in a community. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that concept and idea behind security communities 
have never been confined to the governmental level and include a sense of 
community that encompasses a “we feeling”. This is generally characterised by 
mutual sympathy, consideration, loyalties, trust and responsiveness in decision-
                                            
8 This is not a rejection of the existence of ideas and values such as pan-Africanism 
and Ubuntu cutting across boundaries. However, as Lodge (2003) rightly points out, 
these principles often do not represent more than mere political rhetoric that is used 
to sell another political message and objective. The use of the term ‘renaissance’ 
may be another example of this (Lodge 2003).  
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making (Nathan 2006:276), a trust that, according to Vale (2003:121) and Swatuk 
(2003:8), cannot be found in the SADC. The recent attempts of creating a 
SADCBRIG support this claim. One of the problems for SADC members in this 
regard is the internal instability in several of the member states, which makes it 
difficult to create trust amongst and in between member states. A security 
community cannot simply be understood as the absence of war, nor even of the 
likelihood of war between states, but must also be seen as the likelihood of 
instability within states (Nathan 2006:277). 
Several member states continue to be affected by instability and civil strife, and 
the SADC also suffers because the expectation of a continued absence of violence 
and peaceful change is missing.9 Intrastate conflicts and unrest will continue to 
destabilise the region, and thus jeopardise the potential for a security community to 
exist. However, when dealing with Southern Africa, the importance of the common 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid history should not be underestimated, and this 
constitutes the common sense of belonging in the SADC, that Nathan, Vale and 
Swatuk claim do not exist, but which researchers like Ngoma (2005) argues is 
central to understanding the nature of the SADC cohesion. It is therefore also 
interesting to see that the South African government in August 2008 argued that its 
three main priorities for its SADC chairmanship were deepening regional economic 
integration, intensifying regional infrastructure development, and restoring and 
strengthening political unity and cohesion (Zuma 2008). These three priorities 
indicate that the South African government has recognised the lack of common 
values.  
The role and nature of the African Stand-by Force (ASF): Defence against 
aggression or peace support operations? 
In a speech before the participants of the first expert meeting on the 
establishment of a Common African Defence and Security Policy in Johannesburg, 
the then South African Foreign Minister, Dlamini-Zuma, concluded that, since the 
end of the Cold War had not provided the peace and stability that had been hoped 
for, it was time for a common African Defence and Security policy to be drawn up 
(Zuma 2003). The aim of the policy was to create a new framework that was binding 
on all AU members, forcing them to bring their domestic policies in line with the 
new AU policies. Zuma argues that the drafters needed to go beyond a narrow 
definition of security by using positive experiences and ignoring negative ones in 
                                            
9 In 2009, instability, political and/or military, continued or flared up in places like 
the DR Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Madagascar and Lesotho. In 
September 2009, the DRC even assumed the chairmanship of the SADC, while the 
eastern part of the country continues to be in conflict.  
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drawing up a model document. The ambition was also to breathe new life into 
Kwame Nkrumah’s old idea of creating a common African defence and security 
policy. Collective security and defence treaties will, at the margins, remove the 
perception of threat. However, the nature of this kind of treaty is often determined 
by the power structure within a particular region, which means that when the 
distribution of power between actors changes, the nature of the alliance will change 
as well. Acting against this is the level of the integration and the mere size of the 
alliance. 
The strengthened South African position in the SADC, and in Africa in general, 
has speeded up the regional integration process. South Africa is providing public 
goods to its region, in relation to direct economic investments, but also in 
liberalising trade in Africa and attempting to deliver security through negotiations 
and actual military deployment. South Africa’s power in the system is exercised 
through rules and institutions, and ultimately the weaker partners in the system are 
given informal access to the process of policy formation in both regional and 
continental organisations (Ikenberry 2004:2). South Africa is therefore creating a 
new consensual system, dominated by itself, and basically sustained by its economic 
and, to some extent, military capacity, at least at the sub-regional level and to a 
lesser extent at the continental level. The states in the SADC seek to co-operate and 
manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to silence the security dilemma 
through both their own actions and their assumptions about the behaviour of others 
(Jervis 1985:78; Jervis 1982:364).  
The SADC treaty of 1992 is an example of confidence-building measures, in 
which the respective states expressed the goal of creating formal institutional 
frameworks for future co-operation in the area of security. These initiatives were 
based on the informal FLS structure, which had co-ordinated the struggles of South 
Africa’s neighbours against the apartheid state. In the case of SADC and even the 
AU, it could be argued that the signing of the MDP and the Constitutive Act of the 
AU, apart from being formal agreements transferring some national sovereignty, 
both function as threat-reducing measures in inter-state relations and as building 
blocks in the creation of a new security structure in Africa. In the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), this process of creating confidence-building 
measures was described as an “open-door closed-door strategy”, that is, one of 
replacing “bad habits” with new and better ones (Short & Castleman 2003). By 
getting its African partners to sign the new agreements, the South African 
government is hoping that they will also be compelled to follow the very same 
agreements and principles over time. 
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The new African Defence and Security Policy expresses the aim of being able to 
fend off perceived external threats to the security of the AU members, including 
preventing war among themselves. This basic principle was stressed by former 
Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, when, in his capacity as chairman of the 
AU, he stated concerning the ASF (African Standby Force) that:  
From a strategic point of view, the African Standby Force represents 
a dissuading factor against threats to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of our states. It would be an instrument for intervention 
(Chissano 2004). 
The wording is interesting, because Chissano focused on the issues of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity when addressing the question of the ASF, very 
much in line with the principles outlined in the SADC MDP. Furthermore, the 
description “a dissuading” factor is also interesting because it does not say who is 
being dissuaded. Was this a message to the warring parties in the DRC, primarily 
Uganda and Rwanda, or was it focused outside Africa as a deterrence to outside 
aggression against Sudan? As former Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma argued, this 
whole notion is based on the idea of the ASF as a collective defence structure rather 
than as a means of collective security. This was underlined by the signing of the AU 
Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact in January 2005, which focused on 
common defence, not collective security. This pact states that an attack on one 
member is to be considered an attack on all, and that the signatories are obliged to 
respond with all available means (AU 2005a Article 1 c i ; Article 4b).  
The South African scholar Peter Vale (2003:36) argued in his book on regional 
security dynamics in Southern Africa, that in the colonial states in southern Africa, 
the crucial issue was not the security of the general population in the territories, but 
protection of the in-migrating minority against the native majority. Since 
independence, this has continued in different forms, but the basic principle continues 
to be the same, namely security is concerned with protecting some sections of these 
states’ societies against other sections. This touches on the two basic interpretations 
of the nature of the ASF, namely that it is either a tool for the current African elite 
for safeguarding their powerbase, or that the ASF is the claimed tool of being able to 
prevent and stop future Rwandan-type genocides, which was also recently noted by 
Baker and Maeresera (2009). 
The truth should probably be found somewhere in between, which, for instance, 
has been visible in the different interpretations of the mandate, organisation and 
composition of the ASF in the different regions. In the case of EASBRIG, there is no 
existing regional organisation that includes all members of the eastern region – a 
matter complicating the setting up of the brigade. EASBRIG members expect that 
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the brigade is to be used inside its own region, for instance in Somalia. It could 
therefore be seen as a tool for the often-undemocratic leaders in the region to ward 
of potential competitors. In the SADC, the ASF forms an integrated part of the 
regional structures, and for members like South Africa it is also a means of making 
sure that a new DRC-type intervention does not take place again by institutionalising 
principles for deployment and interventions. Former South African Deputy Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Pahad, argued in 2007 that the future tasks of the SADCBRIG 
were to handle for instance intra-state conflicts. 
Such intra state conflicts and trans-national activities are generally 
perpetrated by sub state actors or “war lords”, non-state actors, 
militias, criminal elements and armed civilians and not solely by 
regular armies. As a result social cohesion and state institutions 
collapse, law and order breaks down, banditry and chaos prevail and 
the civilian population flees the conflict region or the country.10 
Pahad’s view stresses South Africa’s focus on the role of the SADCBRIG, and 
the African security architecture in general as a means to stop and deal more 
effectively with conflict and emergency on the continent. However, different 
interpretations exist within SADC as illustrated for instance by Chissano’s statement 
that the SADCBRIG should be seen as a dissuading factor against aggression, and 
the split experienced in the organisation related to the crisis in Zimbabwe. These 
interpretations see the regional security architecture more as a collective defence 
mechanism than as a broader collective security institution.  
One of the problems of having a security structure within the SADC structure is 
that it relies on states to solve problems between states, even though many of these 
states constitute the very problem. Member states are themselves frequently a source 
of instability, governed as they are by corrupt leaders, neo-patrimonial structures and 
various degrees of despotism. National interests are therefore often incompatible 
with regional interests (Van Nieuwkerk 1999:2). However, the MDP plays an 
important confidence-building role and could be seen as an attempt to revive the 
SADC and advance stipulations concerning future defence co-operation. The MDP 
has therefore turned out to be an important element in the creation of the 
SADCBRIG as part of the wider AU security architecture.  
 
 
                                            
10 Media briefing by Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad, Media Centre, Amphitheatre, 
Union Buildings, Pretoria, 15 August 2007. 
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The African Stand-by Force: Principles and guidelines 
The July 2002 establishment of the ASF was the culmination of a long process 
in which African states had expressed the ambition of creating a military capacity 
and thus of providing themselves with a tool to deal with and manage conflicts on 
the continent. Article 13 of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) as one of the AU’s institutions, stated that: 
In order to enable the Peace and Security Council to perform its 
responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support 
missions and intervention pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the 
Constitutive Act, an African Stand-by Force shall be established. 
Such Force shall be composed of Stand-by multidisciplinary 
contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries 
of origin and be ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice 
(AU 2002 Article 13–1).  
It was therefore stipulated that the ASF should include standby multi-disciplinary 
components with civilian, police, and military component located in home countries.  
Each of the AU’s five economic regions, not identical with the existing sub-
regional organisations in Africa, became responsible for setting up an extended 
brigade-size formation of up to 6 000 military and civilian personnel, including a 
brigade HQ, four infantry formations, reconnaissance capabilities, medical units, 
engineering capabilities and a helicopter unit.11 The first phase of the formation ran 
until June 2005 and was focused on the establishment of planning elements 
(PLANELM) for the AU and creating capacity for handling situations falling under 
scenarios 1 and 2 listed below and the regions had to be able to handle scenarios 3 
and 4. In Phase 2 from 2005–2010, the AU and its regions are scheduled to build 
capacities enabling them to handle situations like the ones lined out in scenarios 5–6. 
                                            
11 (AU 2005b Annex A Section II 1a). The individual brigades are to consist of: a 
brigade (mission level), headquarters and support unit, a headquarter company and 
support unit, four light infantry battalions, an engineer unit, a light signals unit, 
reconnaissance company (wheeled), a helicopter unit with four helicopters, a 
military police unit, a light multi-role logistical unit, a level-II medical unit, a 
military observer group, a civilian support group consisting of logistical, 
administrative and budget components. The policy framework sets the following 
additional military, police and civilian stand-by list targets to be maintained 
centrally by the AU: 300–500 military observers (MilObs), 240 civilian police 
(CivPol), and an unspecified roster of civilian experts to fill the human rights, 
humanitarian, governance, demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation and 
reconstruction structure (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). 
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The AU has decided that the civilian roster of experts is not a Phase-1 priority 
because UN humanitarian, development and human rights elements, which do not 
require a mandate from the UN Security Council, could deploy in tandem with an 
ASF mission. The following six missions and scenarios inform the ASF structure: 
- Scenario 1. AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment 
required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution; 
- Scenario 2. AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission. 
Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution; 
- Scenario 3. Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required 
within 30 days of an AU mandate resolution; 
- Scenario 4. AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive 
deployment missions (and peace building). Deployment required within 30 days of 
an AU mandate resolution; 
- Scenario 5. AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping 
missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed 
deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate resolution, with the 
military component being able to deploy within 30 days; and 
- Scenario 6. AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the 
international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU 
would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days. 
Furthermore, the roadmap plan for the ASF stipulates that in the case of genocide, 
the ASF-contingents must be able to deploy within two weeks’ notice, and not the 
thirty days required for the military component of traditional Peace Support 
Operations (PSO) missions. This means that brigade HQ capacity and logistic 
support must be in place at all times, i.e. the ASF structure needs its own permanent 
logistical capacity in order to be able to deploy within this timeframe. It is, 
moreover, acknowledged that, because no major military alliance exists on the 
continent, individual members, in effect the regional powers, are the only states 
possessing this capacity (AU 2005b Annex A Section II 1a). In addition to this, the 
AU members have decided to establish regionally based battalion-sized rapid 
reaction capabilities within each of the five regions under direct AU control (AU 
2009). International donors like the UK, Denmark, France and the US are all 
involved in supporting and training these units.  
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The SADC stand-by force (SADCBRIG) 
The SADC brigade shall … serve in peace-building efforts, 
including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation and 
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian 
populations in conflict areas and support efforts on major natural 
disasters (Mwanawasa 2007). 
In the preamble to the SADC MOU on the SADCBRIG it is stated that the 
ambition with the creation of the SADCBRIG is to “unite our efforts towards 
collective self-defence and security and the preservation of peace and stability” 
(SADC 2007). Compared to Mwanawasa’s statement above, the ambitions outlined 
out in the MOU with the SADCBRIG seem wider. Here both collective defence and 
collective security are included. This of course also correlates with the 2003 MDP 
that stresses the collective defence nature in the military co-operation in the region. 
The SADC is for instance the only region that has agreed on intelligence co-
operation and exchange of information, thereby widening the early warning element 
that is also an integral part of the African security architecture in general. In the 
MOU, the potential tasks of the brigade are listed in accordance with Article 13 of 
the AU PSC Protocol as: 
- observations and monitoring missions; 
- other types of peace support missions; 
- intervention in a state party in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of 
that state party, or to restore peace and security in accordance with Article 4(h) 
and (j) of the Constitutive Act; 
- preventive deployment in order to prevent: (i) a dispute or conflict from escalating; 
(ii) an on-going violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states; 
and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an 
agreement; 
- peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilisation; 
- humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict 
areas and support; and 
- any other functions as may be authorised by the SADC Summit (SADC 2007 
Article 4). 
In an attempt to deal effectively with the tasks listed above, the 2007 MOU 
stresses that the SADCBRIG is to have a military, a police and a civilian element 
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included. However, as listed further below the formation of the civilian part has been 
delayed, something that is not unique to SADC (AU 2009). 
The staffing of the multinational planning team for SADC ASF commenced in 
February 2005 and is already in place (Ratala 2008). The planning team has the 
responsibility of assisting in the day-to-day activities of the force and of monitoring 
deployment readiness (Lekota 2005). This is one of the areas where the force has 
experienced problems, which is closely related to the lack of trust and a “we feeling” 
between the SADC members, as argued earlier. Even though the members have 
pledged forces to the SADCBRIG, it has been difficult to be allowed to inspect these 
pledged capabilities, often due to security concerns. A general trust lacks amongst 
members to allow SADC officials to inspect its contingents. Another element is that 
the pledged forces and capabilities are often not readily available. The dedicated 
contingents are either being used for other tasks, and are therefore not on stand-by, 
or the pledged capability simply does not exist and will only be available at a later 
date (Ratala 2008). Despite this, there seem to be consensus between different 
government departments in South Africa, that the SADCBRIG will be operational 
by the summer of 2010, even though it was described in 2008 as a “paper tiger” 
(Bona 2008; Ratala 2008).  
An important part of the process of operationalising the SADCBRIG is to have 
joint standards of training and doctrines. As mentioned above, the SADC’s RPTC is 
located in Harare, and was initially an important institution in creating a common 
platform and interoperability amongst between the different forces. However, the 
RPTC was closed in 2002 due to the withdrawal of donor funding.12 This was a 
severe setback in the attempt to secure harmonisation and co-operation in 
peacekeeping between SADC countries. The centre lacks funding, but has 
nonetheless been designated to function as the SADC’s regional PSO training 
centre. However, in 2009 an EU expert group recommended that the RPTC should 
be supported as the only designated regional training centre, directly controlled by 
the OPDSC. This is an important development, because the SADC’s insistence on 
keeping the RPTC as its only designated centre is one of the issues that led to donor 
                                            
12 The RPTC was closed in early 2002 after the Danish government withdrew its 
donor support as a consequence of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. This happened 
despite the fact that Denmark had signed a multilateral agreement with SADC, and 
not Zimbabwe. The matter therefore created a lot of anger amongst member states at 
the time. The Zimbabwe issue has since blocked Danish, and western, donor support 
for the RPTC. The Danish government’s logic is peculiar in the sense that Denmark 
is considering supporting the EASTBRIG, including states like Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Kenya and Somalia, while still refusing to become involved in the SADC on account 
of Zimbabwe.  
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withdrawal in 2002. It has furthermore been an issue that has created severe political 
tension inside SADC, due to primarily Zimbabwe’s insistence on the RPTC as the 
region’s only designated training centre of its kind. This also means that, while 
SADC has not been an efficient tool for South Africa so far in the area of security, 
the organisation now seems to be on the move at last.  
The structure and status of the SADCBRIG 
The AU has, through its framework document, outlined the elements to be 
included in the new brigade structure. However, the respective regions differ in the 
way they have chosen to form and shape their individual brigades. The SADC has, 
for instance, chosen not to form a permanent Brigade HQ, but to set it in place only 
when the brigade is to be deployed. This means that the only standing permanent 
structure in the SADC, apart from training centres, is to be the planning element 
(PLANELM) established at the SADC HQ in Gaborone, Botswana in 2005 (Pahad 
2007). The PLANELM is to be a tool of the OPDSC, taking its guidance from the 
SADC Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff and the Committee of Police Chiefs 
respectively (SADC 2007, Article 6) The SADC members furthermore decided to 
establish a logistics base in Botswana.  
The forces themselves must be on standby in their home countries, and can 
therefore not be designated to other tasks. In the case of a deployment, the 
PLANEM will not be included in the deployed force. Each member state has the 
responsibility of ensuring that the pledged forces are available and have reached a 
level of training that is comparable to the standards outlined by the RPTC on the 
basis on UN/AU standards (SADC 2007, Article 8). The contributing states will be 
reimbursed for their pledged troops and equipment. In the event that they do not 
comply with the operational standards, the reimbursement will be reduced. This is 
important because past experience from South African deployments in the DRC and 
Burundi shows that such designated forces often had problems meeting the 
operational standards required by the UN (see for instance Mandrup 2007a, 
Mandrup 2009). This is however, not a uniquely South African problem, and the 
operational standard of the SANDF must be considered much higher than that of 
many of its SADC partners.  
Despite the mentioned shortcomings and according to the AU itself, the 
formation of SADCBRIG is moving forward at a steady pace. The framework seems 
to have been put in place leaving only the civilian component and standby roster to 
be finalised.  (See Table below) 
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Framework documents  
Memorandum of understanding  
PLANELM  
Brigade HQ  
Pledged Units  
Civilian components On-going 
Centres of excellence  
Stand-by roster On-going 
(Source: AU 2009)  
Part of the establishment of the SADCBRIG is also the accomplishment of 
specific benchmark criteria for testing the operational readiness level of the 
SADCBRIG. The brigade managed early in 2009 to conduct both its Mapping 
Exercise (MAPEX) and its Command Post Exercise (CPX) successfully, while in 
September 2009 it conducted a brigade size (8 000 soldiers) field-training exercise 
(FTX), named Golfinho, which included both maritime and land elements. This 
shows that the SADC members have moved a long way in their attempt to 
operationalise the SADCBRIG. However, the organisation still needs to develop its 
civilian component, because too much of the initial focus centred on the formation 
of military elements (Alghali 2009).  
The primary obstacle in establishing SADCBRIG is a lack of funding (Ratala 
2008). The SADC members have attempted to conduct the exercises and the 
establishment of the SADCBrig without significant donor support. This was done 
for political reasons, in an attempt to remain independent from donor involvement, 
but also as a consequence of the sanctions against Zimbabwe. The problem for the 
SADC members has been and still is that funds are needed to be able to conduct 
training and exercises, to support the running of the RPTC and to ensure that this 
centre has the capacity to function as the regional centre for PSO training, and for 
deployment of the SADCBRIG-designated troops. This is also an area where the 
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political differences between the member states are visible, with certain members 
being more than others willing to accept donor funding. 
South Africa and the SADCBRIG 
Former South African Defence Minister Lekota promised in Parliament that the 
SADC ASF would be structured and ready for simple peace missions by 30 June 
2005. (Lekota 2005) According to the plan listed in the scenarios above, the brigade 
must be fully operational by 2010, and be able to undertake everything from simple 
observer missions to military interventions. South Africa has been very active in the 
formation of the ASF, and SADCBRIG in particular, which, according to the plan, 
should be able to provide the African Union (AU) by 2010 with a rapid reaction 
capability consisting of five regionally based brigades. The responsibility for PSOs 
and the creation of the ASF structures have to a large extent been placed upon the 
regionally dominant states, for instance South Africa in southern Africa and Nigeria 
in West Africa (AU 2005b Annex A Section II 1a). South Africa needs to be able to 
provide the equipment that other members do not possess, as reflected in the 
country’s initial decision to acquire a long-distance transport capability. The 
decision by the South African government to cancel the long-distance aircraft 
acquisition is potentially problematic, because this capability was presented with the 
rationale of providing the African security architecture with a much-needed strategic 
airlift capability. Part of the role as a regional power is that South Africa must be 
willing and able to act as the lead nation in African PSOs. This was – as previously 
mentioned – stressed at the AU level, where the bigger nations have special tasks in 
the ASF (AU 2005b Annex A Section II 1a). The expectations of lead nation come 
both from the global and regional levels and must be seen as necessary if South 
Africa wants acceptance of its benign role outlined in Mbeki’s statement in the 
introduction.  
Even though the Nordic Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)13 
structure is the model on which the AU standby system is based, it is important to 
acknowledge that the ASF must be able to undertake a larger variety of tasks than 
was ever expected of the SHIRBRIG force, which, in its initial phase, was intended 
for peacekeeping missions only. One of the areas where the ASF will differ from the 
SHIRBRIG model is that the individual units will not be self-contained for sixty 
days and each ASF brigade will, therefore, have a standing logistical capability. 
Furthermore, the ASF has distanced itself from the SHIRBRIG model within the 
                                            
13 SHIRBRIG was declared operational on 1 January 2000, and has so far been 
deployed in UN missions in for instance Ethiopia/Eritrea in 2000, and in Sudan in 
2005. The brigade was closed down in June 2009. 
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area of military intervention capacity. The African force will be based on the 
logistical and HQ capabilities of individual members, something not pursued to the 
same degree in the SHIRBRIG case. Thus, the ASF must be seen as a conventional 
military force (though not a standing one), with an offensive capability. This means 
that, in order to be able to fulfil its role as the regional power in SADC, South Africa 
must be able to provide specialised functions, especially in the areas of logistics and 
the HQ role.  
SADC members have nonetheless pledged their contributions to SADCBRIG, 
and South Africa will deliver the capabilities that the other members lack. The South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) has pledged a parachute battalion, 
engineering capability, sanitation (including a field hospital), harbour patrol boats, 
signal capacity, divers, naval support vessel and air transport, to fill the gaps of the 
other member states. However, it is important to notice that most of the pledged 
forces are not rotational, and that several of the pledged units only have limited 
operational readiness. The recent decision by the South African government to 
increase defence spending is a necessary move if the country wants deal effectively 
with the capacity problems in the SANDF.  
According to the South African government’s defence acquisition agency, 
ARMSCOR, the SANDF does have excess capacity in the area of, for instance, 
communications, which would enable it to provide this capability to the other 
members of an SADC-based ASF (ARMSCOR 2004). Furthermore, the SANDF’s 
future is more focused on SADC and the AU, that is, on the attempt to assess and 
harmonise force requirements. However, this does not change the fact that the 
SANDF faces serious problems to maintain acceptable operational readiness levels 
and thus placing serious questions marks on its ability to function in the lead nation 
role.14  
South Africa’s military capabilities and its ability to function as a lead nation in 
PSOs and in the SADCBRIG may seem bleak. There seem to be two aspects to this. 
One is the force-to-force15 ratio in future deployments, that is, how many and what 
quality of soldiers and equipment does South Africa need in order to fulfil its future 
African deployments? Conflicts in Africa are usually low-tech and low-intensity by 
nature. The technological level of the SANDF will exceed the forces it will 
encounter while deployed. It will therefore have technological advantages compared 
                                            
14 See for instance the DOD Budget briefing to the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Defence, July 2009; DOD annual reports for the last ten years; 
Mandrup 2007a; Mandrup 2009. 
15 Force-to-force ratios measure how big an international force has to be to balance 
the indigenous force and enable it to fulfil its mandate.  
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to most African armies or militias it will be faced with. Moreover, the SANDF is a 
relatively potent and disciplined force, though there is a general perception within 
the force of a lowered capacity and quality. The second aspect is the force-space 
ratio in relation to the tasks given to the SANDF. It is clear that this is potentially a 
problem for the SANDF due to its current limited deployment capacity. If the 
maximum sustainable force level that the SANDF can deploy is approximately 
4 000 soldiers (the level in 2009), this might well turn out to be insufficient to solve 
the tasks that South Africa will be expected to solve. However, the capacity to 
function as a lead nation is not necessarily tied to the capacity to deploy large force 
numbers. Of significance for South Africa is the country’s ability to provide the 
critical functions and thus to tie the operation together. South Africa is slowly 
expanding its capacity in this regard and will be able to undertake such a 
commitment. Nigeria, by comparison, has an army of 150 000 soldiers and a much 
larger deployment potential, but it lacks much of the critical functional capacity 
required.16 Due to South Africa’s economic priorities and the structural problems of 
the SANDF itself, it seems unlikely that its capacity will exceed the current 4 000 
ceiling during peacetime. 
It is important to realise that so far the SANDF has been able to carry out the 
tasks it has been allocated. It can be argued that this relatively limited armed force 
has shown an impressive ability to simultaneously deploy more than 4 700 soldiers 
internationally and domestically since the summer of 2003. Deployment in 
international PSOs has also given the SANDF valuable mission experience, which 
will be extremely useful in setting up the SADCBRIG. The first phase of the 
strategic defence procurements for new naval and air systems will also have made its 
impact felt, and thanks to the initiation of a second phase of the acquisition 
programme in 2010, the army will be able to benefit from an increased focus 
regarding its equipment needs. However, the problems it has in attracting and 
retaining critical personnel will reduce its capacity to deliver such capabilities to the 
SADC ASF brigade. What is interesting to see is that the co-operation, and 
especially contributions in SADCBRIG, is described as joint SADC, when South 
Africa in reality is often the main provider. However, this is not unique to the 
SADC, but can be seen in several international organisations, like for instance 
NATO, where bigger states often provide more capabilities, but the effort is 
presented as combined.  
                                            
16 In the African Union Mission in Sudan, South Africa was the only contingent that 
brought its own equipment. The other force contributors were provided with their 
main equipment from Western donors, either directly or indirectly from private 




This article commenced by asking whether a lack of common values was 
blocking the creation of a security community in the SADC. There is no clear 
answer to this question. SADC members have introduced a number of treaties that 
indicate both shared values and a sense of common belonging. This shows that the 
intention to create a security community is there, thus making collective defence 
redundant. However, the organisation is split between the reformists and a group of 
states that only pay lip service to the principles of democratic governance and 
human rights, Zimbabwe being a good example. Only time will show whether the 
South African strategy of being a good example and expecting fellow members to 
implement the new common SADC values will actually work. The 2008 elections in 
Zimbabwe once again functioned as a litmus test for SADC members’ willingness to 
take the democratic principles that is said to tie the organisation together seriously, 
or, as Vale and others argue, to show whether the organisation’s very existence is 
tied to that of protecting the political elites in power. At the moment, the nature of 
SADCBRIG points in both directions, as alluded to by the SADCBRIG MOU’s dual 
focus on collective defence and collective security. 
Whether the SADCBRIG will be fully operational by 2010 is too early to say, 
but South Africa is doing much to make it happen. The recently conducted brigade 
size exercise, FTX Golfinho, showed that the SADCBRIG has moved some way in 
becoming operational. However, the continued instability in some SADC member 
states means that serious questions hang over their ability to provide the pledged 
units. Much depends on the larger and stronger member states to take the lead and 
provide the capabilities that the other states cannot. The Pretoria government’s 
decision to cancel the acquisition of long-distance military transport planes is not 
good news. It could be a signal from the South African government that it 
increasingly focuses on domestic issues.  
However, the major question is whether a lead nation will be a necessary 
condition for making the SADCBRIG work. The lack of trust between members 
results in difficulties or long-term lapses to establish the SADCBRIG. Another 
problem could be that it can become difficult for SADCBRIG members to agree on 
when, how and under which conditions the brigade should be deployed, especially if 
the members do not share common values. South Africa, as the regional power, 
therefore needs to create the required framework and sense of security for member 
countries, to build trust. South Africa consequently needs to be willing and able to 
provide this framework, and not just to be a partner. However, South Africa also 
needs to have a force with a readiness level that allows it to function effectively as a 
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